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Abstract 
 
The justice system should operate free of any bias, and jurors’ judgments of a defendant’s 
guilt should be based on evidential factors alone. However, research suggests that this does not 
always occur. We aimed to investigate the biasing effect of offence seriousness, a case-related, 
extra-legal factor, on juror decision-making. In an experiment, we examined the effect of this 
extra-legal factor on 118 members of the jury eligible publics’ interpretations of Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt (BRD), probability of commission, verdict, and confidence in verdict.  
We found that defendants charged with more serious offences were judged to be less 
likely to have committed the crime. However, offence seriousness did not have a significant 
effect on interpretations of BRD or verdict. The present findings suggest a need to instruct jurors 
on the application of legal (probative) factors alone. 
 
Keywords: Juror decision-making, offence seriousness, extra-legal factors, beyond reasonable 
doubt, verdict, acquittal, probability of commission 
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Introduction 
Jurors are responsible for reaching verdicts in criminal cases that are based on the 
evidence admitted in court. Although some research suggests that jurors do indeed focus on legal 
factors in a case (e.g. Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Devine, Buddenbaum, Houp, Studebaker, & 
Stolle, 2009), other research demonstrates that jurors also rely on extra-legal factors (see Devine, 
Clayton, Dunford, Seying & Pryce, 2001 for a review). For the most part, past research on this 
topic has focused on the effect of person-related, extra-legal factors (see Devine & Caughlin, 
2014). This has revealed factors leading to acquittal bias such as defendant attractiveness and 
those resulting in conviction bias such as jurors’ authoritarian attitudes. In addition to person-
related factors, research has also suggested that case-related, extra-legal factors can have a 
biasing effect on juror decision-making (e.g., Ruva & McEvoy, 2008; Terrance, Matheson & 
Spanos, 2000).  
One case-related, extra-evidential factor that has attracted research attention is the 
seriousness of the offence a defendant is charged with (e.g., Kerr, 1978; Koch & Devine, 1999; 
Vidmar, 1972). This factor suggests that the juror may be unduly biased by thoughts of “what 
may happen to the defendant” if convicted of a serious crime that carries a severe penalty. In 
arriving at a judgment of guilt or innocence, however, jurors should not consider the seriousness 
of the charge associated with an offence. 
In this article, we report the results of an experiment examining the effects of offence 
seriousness on juror decision-making. The systematic study of the effect of extra-legal factors on 
jurors’ decisions can help improve our theoretical understanding of their decision-making. In 
addition, and following in a tradition of past psycho-legal research, it may inform legal policies 
  
and procedures that aim to improve the process of jury decision-making, trial outcomes, and 
perceptions of the justice system (Bornstein & Greene, 2011).   
Offence Seriousness 
 Offence seriousness could bias jurors towards acquittal or conviction. The seriousness of 
an offence may have a direct effect on juror’s evaluations of how likely a defendant is to have 
committed the crime, their interpretation of beyond reasonable doubt (BRD) and/or their verdict.  
With one exception (de Keijser, de Lange, and van Wilsem (2014), past research suggests that 
this case-related, extra-evidential factor either has no effect on juror decision-making (Freedman, 
Krismer, MacDonald & Cunningham, 1994; Rind, Jaeger, & Strohmetz, 1995; Simon, Snow & 
Read, 2004)  or leads to an acquittal bias ( Goodman-Delahunty, Martschuk, & Ockenden,2016; 
Kaplan & Simon, 1972; Kerr, 1978; Koch & Devine, 1999; Martin & Schum, 1987;  McComas 
& Noll, 1974; Vidmar, 1972).  
 Only study has found a conviction biasing effect of offence seriousness. De Keijser, de 
Lange, and van Wilsem (2014) examined the effect of offence seriousness (i.e., shoplifting, 
burglary and rape) on people’s attitudes towards a measure of the Blackstone ratio1, which is a 
proxy for BRD. They found that the Blackstone ratio decreased when the seriousness of the 
offence increased, with a lower standard of proof required in a case involving a more serious 
crime and so a greater likelihood of conviction.  
 However, several studies have reported an opposite i.e., acquittal-biasing effect of offense 
seriousness. These studies have used different (and sometimes multiple) measures. Vidmar 
(1972) demonstrated acquittal bias in a study where mock jurors were provided with a 
combination of two, three or four offence alternatives made up of first degree murder, second 
                                                 
1
 In this study, the Blackstone ratio was measured by the open question, ‘how many guilty people in similar cases should be acquitted in order to 
prevent one innocent person from wrongful conviction?’ 
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degree murder, manslaughter and not guilty. He found that given at least a moderate offence 
severity option, jurors seldom voted not guilty whereas given only a serious offence severity 
option, more than half of jurors voted not guilty.  Similarly, Goodman-Delahunty, Martschuk, & 
Ockenden (2016) found that mock-jurors were significantly less likely to convict a defendant 
charged as a terrorist than a defendant charged with attempted murder. This suggests that mock 
jurors may have perceived a terrorism charge as more serious than a non-terrorism charge, 
biasing judgments regarding the defendant’s guilt. 
 Martin and Schum (1987) gave mock jurors a list of ten criminal offences (e.g., aggravated 
assault; murder, petty theft, narcotics peddling) together with possible penalties. They found that 
mock jurors raised their BRD threshold in response to the murder charge, thus making them 
more likely to acquit. Koch and Devine (1999) varied the definition of BRD in addition to 
varying offence seriousness. They found that juries with the option to convict on a lesser charge 
(i.e., voluntary manslaughter v. murder), produced more overall convictions than juries receiving 
only the primary charge, therefore demonstrating an acquittal bias. However, this effect was 
limited to the condition where BRD was undefined. 
 Kerr (1978) varied offence seriousness (i.e., first and second degree murder and 
manslaughter) and found an acquittal biasing effect whereby the more serious the offence, the 
lower the rating of the defendant’s guilt and the lower the likelihood of conviction. Similarly, 
McComas and Noll (1974) manipulated offence seriousness (i.e., first and second degree murder, 
and manslaughter) and found an acquittal biasing effect of offence seriousness on jurors’ 
probabilities of guilt and their verdicts. One study has examined the acquittal biasing effect of 
offence seriousness in the context of evidence evaluation. Kaplan and Simon (1972) found that, 
  
even when evidence for guilt was high or mixed, the more serious the charge, the greater the 
likelihood of jurors acquitting the defendant.  
 As mentioned, a number of studies have found no conviction or acquittal biasing effect of 
offence seriousness on juror/jury decision-making. Simon, Snow and Read (2004) reported that 
offence seriousness (i.e., simple theft versus theft resulting in an individual’s death) had no effect 
on jurors’ conviction rates. Freedman, Krismer, MacDonald and Cunningham (1994) conducted 
a series of seven separate experiments in which they manipulated seriousness of charge (e.g., 
robbery and murder, robbery and assault, robbery and aggravated assault). In all experiments, 
Freedman et al., (1994) found no effect of offence seriousness on probability of commission, 
verdict or verdict confidence. Finally, in a study examining the effect of offence seriousness on 
jurors’ use of inadmissible evidence, Rind, Jaeger, and Strohmetz (1995) found no evidence for a 
direct effect of offence seriousness on juror decision-making.  
 In sum, research findings on the effects of offence seriousness on juror decision-making 
are mixed. Specifically, while some studies demonstrate an acquittal-biasing effect of offence 
seriousness, one finds a conviction-biasing effect, and others find no effect. It is unclear to what 
extent this is due to differences in the measures used. 
The Present Study 
 The present study aims to contribute to the above body of research in two main ways. First, 
it aims to further explore the potential biasing effect of offence seriousness on interpretations of 
BRD, which to-date has only been studied twice previously (i.e., Kerr, 1978; Martin and Schum, 
1987). Kerr (1978) found that interpretations of BRD were significantly higher when the offence 
was more severe. Compatible with this, Martin and Schum (1987) found that interpretations of 
BRD were significantly higher for murder than any other offence.  
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 Second, the present study aims to examine a wide range of juror behaviour that may be 
affected by offence seriousness. In addition to verdict, we measured probability of commission, 
interpretations of BRD, and confidence in verdict. This will contribute to a better understanding 
of any biasing effect of offence seriousness on the process of juror decision-making. For 
example, does the acquittal biasing effect emerge at the stage when jurors’ are judging the 
probability of commission, and before they decide on a verdict? 
The specific objectives of the present study were to investigate the effect of offence 
seriousness on: (1) jurors’ interpretations of BRD, (2) their judgments of the probability that the 
defendant committed the crime, (3) their verdicts, and (4) their confidence in verdicts. Although 
there is some evidence to suggest an acquittal biasing effect, it is difficult for us to make strong a 
priori predictions because some past research has found no such effect, and one study has found 
the opposite (i.e., conviction biasing) effect. In addition, a number of the studies only measure 
verdict and so have little to offer in terms of predictions about the effect of offence seriousness 
on other aspects of the juror decision-making process.  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and eighteen members of the jury eligible public were recruited from a large 
company in the United Kingdom that has a multi-building site and employs over 700 people in a 
wide range of roles from packers through clerical staff to medics. They volunteered to participate 
in return for a £10 payment. Seventy percent of participants were female. On average, 
participants were aged 33.37 years (SD = 1.69; ranging from 18 to 62). Ninety-two percent 
described themselves as Caucasian. Seventy-one percent had a university degree and 53.0% were 
employed at a professional level. Five percent said they had served on a jury before.  
  
Design 
We employed a between-subjects experimental design. Offence seriousness was the 
independent variable with two levels (i.e., more and less serious). The more serious offence was 
‘attempted murder’ and the less serious was ‘common assault.’  
Stimuli and Measures 
Participants were asked to imagine that they were serving on a jury in a criminal trial. 
They read a short trial summary of an adult male charged with a violent offence and were told 
that the defendant faced a charge of either common assault or attempted murder (see Appendix). 
The case was designed to be equivocal with regards to the evidence so that it would result in 
some variance in verdicts. A pilot test (n = 20) confirmed this (i.e., 54.8% of the participants in 
the pilot test voted guilty; none of the pilot participants were included in the present study). In 
the present study, 57.1% of participants found the defendant guilty. 
After reading the case and legal arguments, participants read the judge’s instruction on 
the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and standard of proof i.e., that “the defendant is 
presumed innocent unless the prosecution has proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt”. 
Participants then provided their interpretations of BRD. They then rated the probability that the 
defendant had committed the crime as charged, rendered a verdict, and rated their confidence in 
the verdict. The measurement scales for these variables are described below. 
Interpretations of BRD were measured using the Membership Function method (MF; 
Dhami, 2008; Dhami, Lundrigan & Mueller-Johnson, 2015; Dhami & Wallsten, 2005; 
Lundrigan, Dhami & Mueller-Johnson, 2016; Mueller-Johnson, Dhami & Lundrigan, 2018) and 
Direct Rating method (DR; Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996; Kagehiro, 1990; Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, 
Meek, Holt, & Davis, 1976; Montgomery, 1998). The DR method required participants to rate 
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the minimum threshold at which they would be prepared to convict the defendant from 0 to 
100% (in 5% increments). This provides a point interpretation of BRD. As Figure 1 shows, the 
MF method involved presenting participants with the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ along 
with 11 21-point scales anchored at each end from ‘not at all’ to ‘absolutely’. Each scale 
corresponds to one of 11 percentage points ordered from 0% to 100% (in 5% increments). 
Participants responded to the question “to what extent would each of these values substitute for 
the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’?” by marking a point along each scale from ‘not at all’ to 
‘absolutely.’ The MF provides a ‘peak’ interpretation of BRD (i.e., the percentage value at which 
the participant provides a rating of ‘absolute’), as well as a minimum interpretation (i.e., the first 
value that has a more than ‘not at all’ rating), and range of interpretations (i.e., the difference 
between the minimum value and the maximum value). Both the DR and MF method have been 
shown to reliably capture mock jurors’ interpretations of BRD and predict their verdicts (e.g., 
Dhami, 2008; Dhami, Lundrigan & Mueller-Johnson, 2015; Lundrigan, Dhami & Mueller-
Johnson, 2016). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Participants’ judgments of the probability that the defendant committed the crime were 
measured on a 0-100% scale marked at 5% increments. Verdict options were either ‘not guilty’ 
or ‘guilty’. Confidence in verdict was measured on a 0-100% scale marked at 10% increments. 
Finally, a manipulation check question was also included. This asked participants to rate 
how serious the charge was against the defendant, on an 11-point scale ranging from ‘not at all’ 
to ‘extremely’.  
Procedure 
  
Recruitment posters were placed across the multi-building site and emails asking for 
volunteers were sent out to all employees. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
experimental conditions. The data was collected individually, using paper-pencil at the 
recruitment site. The experiment took approximately 15-20 minutes. Demographic data was also 
collected on participants (i.e., gender, age, ethnicity, education level, employment, and jury 
experience).  
Results
2
 
 An independent samples t-test demonstrated that our manipulation of offence seriousness 
was successful. The attempted murder case was perceived to be significantly more serious (M = 
8.17, SD = 1.97) than the common assault case (M = 5.33, SD = 2.02), t (107) = -7.41, p < .001. 
The effect size for this analysis, d = 1.43, 95% CI [1.01, 1.84], exceeds Cohen’s (1988) 
convention for a large effect (.80). 
We measured participants’ interpretations of BRD using the MF and DR methods. The 
mean ‘peak’ interpretation of BRD according to the MF method was 97.76% (SD = 4.79) for 
participants in the attempted murder condition compared to 96.96% (SD = 7.23) for those in the 
common assault condition. For the DR method, participants in the attempted murder condition 
had a mean interpretation of 82.13% for BRD (SD = 13.62) whereas those in the common assault 
condition interpreted BRD as 82.32% (SD = 12.90). The mean differences between the two 
conditions for both measures of BRD were non-significant, p = .537 d = .12, 95% CI [-0.26, 
0.50] and p = .940 d = .01, 95% CI [-0.36, 0.39] respectively. There was no significant difference 
between the attempted murder and the common assault condition for either the mean minimum 
                                                 
2
 In addition to the independent samples t-tests reported in the Results section, we also computed one MANOVA 
which included all of the dependent measures. The results of this MANOVA replicated those of the t-tests reported 
here. 
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MF interpretation, p = .377, d = .17, 95% CI [-0.21, 0.55] or mean MF range, p = .377 d = .17 
95% CI [-0.21, 0.55]. 
Offence seriousness had a significant effect on probability of commission judgments, t 
[108] = 2.77, p = .007, d = .53, 95% CI [0.15, 0.91]. On average, participants in the attempted 
murder condition considered the defendant to be significantly less likely to have committed the 
crime (M = 65.37, SD = 20.75) than did those in the common assault condition (M = 75.26, SD = 
16.59).  
 Fifty-two percent of participants in the attempted murder condition rendered a guilty 
verdict compared to 62.0% in the common assault condition. However, a Chi-square test 
indicated that offence seriousness was not significantly associated with verdict, (χ2 [1,112] = 
1.19, p = .275, OR = .658. 
Offence seriousness had no significant effect on participants’ confidence in their verdicts, 
t [109] = 1.81, p = .073, d = .03, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.72]. The mean confidence ratings of 
participants in the attempted murder condition was 61.91 (SD = 22.50) compared to 69.12 (SD = 
19.39) for those in the common assault condition.  
Discussion 
A number of studies have demonstrated that extra-legal factors may lead to an acquittal 
bias (e.g., Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Schvey, Puhl, Levandoski & Brownell, 2013). In the 
present study, we investigated the possible biasing effect of one case-related, extra-evidential 
factor i.e., offence seriousness, on aspects of the juror decision-making process. We measured 
not only verdicts but interpretations of BRD, probability of commission, and confidence in 
verdict. Past research has tended to focus on verdict as a measure of juror decision-making and 
there are no studies that examine the range of measures included here. It is important to consider 
  
multiple stages along the decision-making process in juror research in order to capture different 
effects at different stages of the process rather than viewing juror decision-making as one single 
judgmental process similarly affected (Bellin, 2010). Furthermore, different measures may be 
more or less sensitive to experimental effects (e.g., Dhami, 2008). 
We found a significant effect of offence seriousness on judgments of the probability that 
the defendant committed the crime. This is consistent with McComas and Noll (1974) and Kerr 
(1978) but inconsistent with Freedman et al. (1994). In their study, Freedman et al. (1994) used 
cases where the amount of evidence needed to prove guilt was equal for all the charges under 
examination, whereas McComas and Noll (1974) and Kerr (1978) did not. If the probability of 
commission scale reflects participants’ perception of the apparent weight of evidence against a 
defendant, then this might explain the lack of effect found by Freedman et al. (1994).  
However, the effect of offence seriousness did not carry over to verdicts. Past research on 
the effect of offence seriousness on verdict is mixed. Our findings are consistent with some 
previous studies (i.e., Freedman et al., 1994; Rind et al., 1995; Simon et al., 2004) but 
inconsistent with others (i.e., Kaplan & Simon, 1972; Kerr, 1978; McComas & Noll, 1974; 
Vidmar, 1972). Each of the past studies that found an effect of offence seriousness on verdict 
used homicide as the offence of interest with three levels of seriousness (i.e. 1
st
 degree murder, 
2
nd
 degree murder, manslaughter). Associated with the most serious of these offences is a penalty 
of life imprisonment or death, which may account for the observed effect of seriousness on 
verdict in these past studies. By contrast, studies that found no effect of offence seriousness on 
verdicts, including ours, typically considered offences with less severe penalties attached (i.e., no 
death penalty). 
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At present, it is unclear why the effect of offence seriousness on probability of 
commission did not carry over to verdict, but future research may examine the extent to which 
interpretations of BRD diminish such an effect. Indeed, in relation to the effects of offence 
seriousness on interpretations of BRD, we found no acquittal biasing effect. Two previous 
studies have reported such an effect (i.e., Kerr, 1978; Martin & Schum, 1987), however, they 
suffer from some methodological limitations. Martin and Schum (1987) measured interpretations 
of BRD across different crime types including petty theft, tax evasion and murder, finding an 
effect whereby interpretations of BRD for the murder charge were significantly higher than all 
other charges. Kerr (1978) found that interpretations of BRD were significantly higher when the 
potential penalty was severe than when it was mild and that this effect was most pronounced for 
first-degree murder and manslaughter. Both studies used a very different method for measuring 
interpretations of BRD than we did. Rather than measure interpretations of BRD directly, as we 
did, they used an indirect measure of interpretations of BRD.  
The fact that we found no significant effect of offence seriousness on interpretations of 
BRD, measured using the direct rating or MF methods, suggests that the influence of this extra-
evidential factor arises at the stage of a trial when a juror is considering the evidence rather than 
at later stages when they are applying the standard of proof. Future research could be designed to 
see if other extra-legal variables such as the consequences of a potential custodial sentence for a 
defendant affect the juror decision-making process in similar ways.  
The most common mechanism put forward to account for an acquittal biasing effect of 
offence seriousness on juror decision-making focuses on the magnitude of potential ‘costs’ 
associated with more serious offences (e.g. Freedman et al., 1994; Kerr, 1978). As offence 
seriousness increases, jurors’ may be less willing to risk type I errors (i.e. convicting an innocent 
  
person) over type II errors (releasing a guilty person) because of the potential consequences of 
conviction. By considering the potential consequences of their verdicts, jurors’ may modify their 
decision-making and be less likely to convict. This can be done by either reducing the probability 
of commission, changing the verdict or increasing the standard or proof. We found that, while 
offence seriousness demonstrated an effect early on in the decision process (i.e., probability of 
commission), this effect did not carry over to verdict or interpretations of BRD. This may be 
because extra-legal factors such as offence seriousness differentially impact stages of the 
decision-making process or perhaps that some stages of the decision-making process are more 
robust to such influence.  
Limitations and Implications 
 It could be argued that the external validity of the present findings is limited because mock 
jurors were used rather than real jurors; that verdicts were examined in the context of a written 
hypothetical case that diverges from the detailed oral and visual representations available at a 
real trial; and that verdicts were only collected at a pre-deliberation stage. The present study used 
the methodological procedures typical of research on jury decision-making, and as we describe 
below, efforts were made to minimize these limitations, although further research examining 
deliberating juries may be of value. 
First, it would be difficult to study real juries in real trial situations. The 1981 Contempt 
of Court Act in the UK currently prohibits the study of real jurors. Unlike much other juror 
decision-making research, the present research did not utilize a student sample. The mock jurors 
in the present research were jury eligible, and 5% had in fact been called for jury service in the 
past. Some studies have also shown few differences between mock and real jurors (e.g. 
Bornstein, 1999; MacCoun & Kerr 1988).  
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Second, while the trial summary was presented in a written format, effort was made to 
make the summary as clear and plausible as possible. Additionally, Bornstein (1999) has 
concluded that there is little negative impact on the validity of jury studies using written 
presentations of trial material.  
Finally, there is evidence that pre-deliberation distribution of verdicts predicts post-
deliberation verdicts (e.g. Kalven & Zeisel 1966; Newkirk, 1981; Sandys & Dillehay, 1995), and 
that interpretations of BRD differ very little from pre- to post-deliberation (Dane, 1985; 
Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996).  
 From a pragmatic standpoint, the fact that jurors may be influenced by extra-evidential 
factors such as offence seriousness underscores the need to instruct them on the application of 
legal (probative) factors alone, irrespective of the potential ‘cost’ to the defendant. The extra-
legal factor studied here is legally relevant at other stages in criminal proceedings (i.e., bail and 
sentencing) but should not inform the decisions made by jurors. Ultimately however, the sub-
conscious level at which extra-legal influences may operate can limit the effectiveness of such 
instructions which are delivered at a conscious level.   
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Figure 1: The Membership Function method 
Below is a list of percentages.  Next to each percentage is a scale from not at all to absolutely. Decide how well you think each percentage 
substitutes for the phrase proof “beyond reasonable doubt.” In other words, imagine each percentage in front of the word ‘proof’ and decide 
how well it describes what “beyond reasonable doubt” means to you in the case of Paul who is charged with attempted murder. For 
example, if you think that 0%, 5% and 10% do not at all substitute for “beyond reasonable doubt”, then circle the left-most point on those 
scales.  If you think 90% absolutely substitutes for “beyond reasonable doubt”, then circle the right-most point on the scale.  And, if you 
think 80% substitutes better than 70%, then circle a point along the 80% scale that is closer to absolutely than the point you circle along the 
70% scale. Make sure you circle one point on each scale.  
 
To what extent can the following percentages substitute for “beyond reasonable doubt”? 
 
 
0% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
5% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
10% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
15% 
 
Not at all    |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
20% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|    Absolutely 
 
 
25% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
30% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
35% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
40% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
45% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
50% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
55% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
60% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
65% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
70% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
75% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
80% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
85% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
90% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
95% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
 
 
100% 
 
Not at all   |---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---|   Absolutely 
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Appendix 
Case materials 
Charge: Paul S is charged with the attempted murder/assault of Roy T on Friday 
December 15
th
 2008 at11.30pm. 
Background:  
On the evening of Friday December 15
th
 Paul S, aged 27, was out for Christmas 
drinks with his friend Chris N, aged 30 in central Cambridge.  They spent the evening 
drinking in a number of pubs before leaving at approximately 11.30pm to walk the mile 
back to their homes.  As they walked across a park, they encountered Roy T, a man who 
they alleged had had an affair with both of their wives in the past. Chris had since 
reconciled with his wife but Paul had separated from his wife and lost custody of their two 
children.  The three men got into a verbal argument and a fight broke out.   Roy was struck 
twice in the face and broke his nose. A pair of hands then grasped his throat from behind 
and someone began to strangle him.  The fight was interrupted by the arrival of the police 
who had been called by two witnesses.   
The prosecution presents a witness who claims that a week earlier he overheard 
Paul and Chris in a pub discussing how they would like to get revenge on Roy.  They then 
present two further witnesses who claim to have seen Paul strangling Roy. The defence 
argue that it was not Paul who strangled Roy and challenge the reliability of all three 
witnesses arguing that there is some evidence that they may have both been heavily 
intoxicated at the time. 
  
